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ABSTRACT 
Sex differences in certain cognitive abilities, including aspects of semantic processing, 
are well established. However, there have been no reports investigating a sex difference 
in semantic categorization. A total of 55 men and 58 women each judged 25 exemplars of 
natural categories (e.g., FRUITS) and 25 of artifact categories (e.g., TOOLS) as a 
nonmember, partial member, or full member of the given category. Participants also rated 
confidence for each judgment. Women provided a greater number vague (partial member) 
judgments, whereas men provided more inclusive (full member) judgments of artifacts 
but more exclusive (nonmember) judgments of natural categories. The sex difference in 
vagueness was observed across domains (Cohen’s d = .56). Confidence predicted 
categorization among both men and women, such that more confident participants 
exhibited fewer vague category judgments. However, men and women were equally 
confident in their category judgments, and confidence failed to explain the sex difference 
in categorization. Men and women appear to categorize the same common objects in 
systematically different ways. 
 
KEYWORDS: artifacts and natural kinds; confidence; semantic categorization; sex 
differences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sex differences in certain aspects of cognition have been established across domains 
and cultures (Kimura, 2002). Men and women display, on average, different patterns of task 
performance in domains such as spatial orientation and verbal or perceptual skills (Kimura, 
2002). For instance, men tend to excel on tasks of spatial ability such as mental rotation (Linn 
& Petersen, 1985; Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden, 1995), whereas women tend to excel on tasks of 
linguistic ability such as verbal fluency (Kolb & Wishaw, 1985; Spreen & Strauss, 1991; for 
review, see Hines, 2009). Although there is substantial overlap between male and female 
performance and cognitive abilities may be better characterized by between-sex similarities 
rather than differences (Hyde, 2005), studying sex differences in cognition is important as it 
may elucidate mechanisms underlying sex-differentiated behavior, which, in turn, may 
inform our understanding of sex stereotypes (Hyde, 2007). 
One aspect of cognition that has not been investigated in terms of a sex difference, 
but could have broad implications, is semantic categorization. Indeed, several studies 
indicate a sex difference in processing natural categories (categories occurring 
independently of human production or intention, such as FRUITS) as well as artifact 
categories (categories occurring by human production or intention, such as TOOLS). 
Whereas women name natural objects faster and more fluently, men name artifacts faster 
and more fluently (Capitani, Laiacona, & Barbarotto, 1999; Laws, 1999). Women also 
recognize natural objects more accurately, whereas men recognize artifacts more 
accurately (Barbarotto, Laiacona, Macchi, & Capitani, 2002). Similar effects have also 
been observed in semantic priming, where natural category names facilitate subsequent 
judgments of their exemplars (e.g., FISH  trout) more strongly for women than for men, 
but artifact category names facilitate judgments (e.g., TOOL  hammer) more strongly for 
men than for women (Bermeitinger, Wentura, & Frings, 2008). Given this sex difference 
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in semantic processing, we hypothesized that categorization would also exhibit a sex 
difference.  
A further finding with respect to natural and artifact categories is that they differ 
in terms of vagueness, i.e., whether membership in the given category is absolute (all-or-
none) or graded (a matter of degree; see Hampton, 2007). Artifact categories tend to be 
judged with more vagueness than natural categories (Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999; 
Estes, 2003; Hampton, 1998; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). For example, a computer may 
partially belong in the category TOOLS, but a tomato tends to be judged either completely 
in or completely out of the category FRUITS. So given the sex difference in processing 
artifacts and natural objects, and given that artifacts and natural objects differ in 
vagueness, we tested whether men and women differ in the vagueness of their category 
judgments.  
In the present study, participants judged whether each of 50 items (e.g., tomato–
FRUITS, computer–TOOLS) is a full member, partial member, or nonmember of its target 
category, and they were informed that “Partial membership means that the item does 
belong in the category, but not to the same extent as some other items.” The percentage of 
partial membership judgments is a measure of category vagueness (Estes, 2003), whereas 
the percentages of full member and nonmember judgments respectively are measures of 
category inclusivity and exclusivity. Because vague category judgments are associated 
with less confidence (Estes, 2004), we also tested whether confidence was related to the 
predicted sex difference in vagueness.  
METHOD 
Participants 
 A total of 113 students and staff at the University of Warwick participated for £3 
each. The mean age was 21.9 years for men (N = 55, SD = 3.4) and 24.1 years for women 
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(N = 58, SD = 8.3). This difference in age was nonsignificant (p > .05). To check the 
sample’s representativeness of men and women, participants’ sex-typedness was assessed 
via a retrospective version of the Pre-school Activities Inventory (PSAI; Golombok & 
Rust, 1993). The PSAI is a robust 17-item measure of self-reported masculinity and 
femininity. As expected, men (M = 69, SD = 9.55) were significantly more masculine 
than women (M = 40, SD = 15.13), t(111) = 12.08, p < .001). In this case, we can assume 
typicality for sex-typedness in the current sample.  
Measures 
 Twenty-five target items from seven artifact categories and 25 target items from 
six natural categories were sampled from Estes (2003). These target items were sampled 
on the basis of prior studies in which the selected items were the most likely to elicit 
disagreement between participants and uncertainty within participants. Thus, all targets 
were “borderline items” for which category membership is unclear and which were most 
likely to elicit vague judgments (Hampton, 2007). Stimuli are shown in the Appendix. 
Note that because most of these categories lack a clear and consensual definition, 
participants’ judgments about these categories are subjective and hence are not 
classifiable as “correct” or “incorrect.” For example, because FISH is not a biologically 
defined category, judging an item to belong or not belong in the category is subjective.    
Procedure 
The items and their target categories were presented in random order, and 
participants judged each item as a nonmember, partial member, or full member of the 
given category. Instructions were based on those used by Estes (2003). Using the example 
billiards:SPORTS, the instructions read: “If you believe that billiards is not a sport, then 
you should check the nonmember box. Or if you think that billiards is only somewhat  a 
member of the category, then you should check the partial member box. But if you 
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believe that it’s just as much a member of the category as any other sport, then you 
should indicate that it’s completely a member by checking the full member box…Partial 
membership means that the item does belong in the category, but not to the same extent 
as some other items.” After each category judgment, participants also rated their 
confidence in that judgment on a scale ranging from 1 = “not at all confident” to 5 = 
“completely confident.”  
RESULTS 
Confidence 
We first examined whether participants’ confidence (i.e., mean confidence ratings) 
predicted the vagueness of their category judgments (i.e., percentage of “partial member” 
judgments). Indeed, more confident participants produced fewer vague category 
judgments (r = -.33, p < .001), and this correlation was observed among both men (r = -
.27, p < .05) and women (r = -.41, p < .01). This significant negative relationship between 
confidence and vagueness corroborates prior research (Estes, 2004). It also indicates that 
any sex difference observed in vagueness might be due to a concomitant sex difference in 
confidence. To test for such a sex difference, participants’ mean confidence ratings were 
analyzed via a 2 (sex) × 2 (domain) ANOVA. Only the expected main effect of domain 
was significant, F(1, 111) = 11.15, p < .001; artifact categories (M = 4.07, SE = .05) were 
judged with greater confidence than natural categories (M = 3.95, SE = .05; see also 
Estes, 2004). For instance, participants were more confident in their judgments of 
whether a computer is a TOOL than of whether a tomato is a FRUIT. More importantly, men 
and women were equally confident in their judgments (M = 4.01, SD = .52, F < 1). Thus, 
if there were a sex difference in categorization, it would not be attributable to a sex 
difference in confidence.  
Categorization 
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Mean percentages of exclusive (“nonmember”), vague (“partial member”), and 
inclusive (“full member”) category judgments are summarized in Table 1 (including 
effect sizes in d; Cohen, 1988). Participants’ mean percentages of vague category 
judgments were analyzed via a 2 (sex) × 2 (domain) ANOVA. In corroboration of prior 
research (e.g., Estes, 2003), artifact categories were judged with more vagueness than 
natural categories, F(1, 111) = 118.01, p < .001. For example, participants were more 
likely to judge that a computer is a partial member of the TOOL category than to judge that 
a tomato is a partial member of the FRUIT category. More importantly, however, sex also 
predicted vagueness, F(1, 111) = 8.89, p < .01. Women provided more vague category 
judgments than men across domains, i.e., sex and domain did not interact (p = .66). The 
effect size of this sex difference in vagueness was medium (d = .56; see Table 1 for effect 
sizes within each domain). To be conservative, we also analyzed these data with 
participants’ mean confidence ratings included as a covariate  (ANCOVA). With 
confidence statistically controlled, the sex difference in vagueness remained significant, 
F(1, 110) = 10.01, p < .01. Thus again, the sex difference in vagueness was not 
attributable to confidence.  
Having observed a robust sex difference in vagueness, we next examined whether 
it was complemented by a sex difference in exclusivity, inclusivity, or both. That is, given 
that men exhibited fewer “partial member” judgments, did they exhibit more 
“nonmember” judgments or more “full member” judgments than women? Participants’ 
mean percentages of exclusive (nonmember) and inclusive (full member) judgments were 
analyzed via a 2 (sex) × 2 (domain) MANOVA. Sex and domain interacted significantly 
in exclusive judgments, F(1, 111) = 4.75, p < .05, and marginally in inclusive judgments, 
F(1, 111) = 3.28, p = .07. As evident in Table 1, men exhibited significantly more 
inclusive judgments of artifacts, t(111) = 2.36, p < .05, but significantly more exclusive 
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judgments of natural categories, t(111) = 2.29, p < .05. For instance, men were more 
likely than women to judge that a computer is a full member of the TOOL category, and 
that a tomato is not at all a FRUIT. These sex differences were also medium, with effect 
sizes of .44 and .43 in the artifact and natural categories respectively. 
Finally, we also tested the generality of these results across items rather than 
participants. Mean percentages of exclusive, vague, and inclusive judgments were 
analyzed via a 2 (sex) × 2 (domain) MANCOVA, with confidence included as a covariate. 
The pattern of results replicated that described above: Vague judgments exhibited 
significant main effects of sex, F(1, 47) = 5.78, p < .05, and domain, F(1, 47) = 150.16, p 
< .001, without interaction (p = .84), whereas significant interactions were observed in 
both exclusive judgments, F(1, 47) = 8.35, p < .01, and inclusive judgments, F(1, 47) = 
8.47, p < .01. 
DISCUSSION 
This study yielded three novel findings. First, these results revealed a domain-
general sex difference in vagueness (d = .56). Women provided more vague judgments 
than men in both artifact and natural categories. Although prior studies have 
demonstrated sex differences in naming (Capitani et al., 1999; Laws, 1999), recognition 
(Barbarotto et al., 2002), and semantic priming (Bermeitinger et al., 2008) of artifact and 
natural objects, the present study provided the first demonstration of a sex difference in 
the categorization of such objects. So whereas prior studies have revealed differences in 
the speed and/or accuracy of participants’ responses, the present study showed a sex 
difference in actual judgments. Men and women categorized the same common objects in 
systematically different ways.  
Second, we also found a domain-specific sex difference in absolute judgments. 
Relative to women, men provided more inclusive judgments of artifacts and more 
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exclusive judgments of natural categories. This finding is broadly consistent with the 
prior demonstrations of a sex difference in semantic processing, with men and women 
exhibiting superior processing of artifacts and natural objects respectively (Barbarotto et 
al., 2002; Capitani et al., 1999; Laws, 1999). For example, in the semantic fluency task 
administered by Capitani et al. (1999), men produced more instances of the category 
TOOLS, whereas women produced more instances of FRUITS. Men’s superior fluency with 
artifact categories may, in fact, be related to the greater inclusivity of their artifact 
categories. That is, if men have more inclusive artifact categories than women, it follows 
that they would have more instances upon which to draw in the semantic fluency task. 
And, conversely, the greater exclusivity of men’s natural categories might also be related 
to their inferior fluency in naming natural objects.  
A third novel finding of this study was that participants’ confidence predicted their 
categorization, but confidence failed to explain the observed sex differences in 
categorization. Confidence negatively predicted vagueness among both men and women, 
such that more confident participants provided fewer vague category judgments (cf. 
Estes, 2004). However, men and women were equally confident in their category 
judgments, and statistically controlling participants’ confidence failed to eliminate the sex 
difference in vagueness. Thus, the sex difference in categorization was not attributable to 
a sex difference in confidence.  
Rather than indicating a sex difference in semantic categorization per se, this 
result could instead reflect a general tendency for women to choose more moderate 
responses than men. That is, women might simply be more likely to select a middling or 
mid-scale response, whereas men might be more likely to select an extreme or endpoint 
response, regardless of the task. If so, then the aforementioned sex difference would say 
little about categorization in particular. We used participants’ confidence ratings to test 
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this potential explanation. We calculated for each participant the percentage of 
confidence ratings that were moderate, operationally defined as any response of 2, 3, or  4 
on the 1-to-5 confidence scale. Contrary to the moderation hypothesis, women were no 
more likely than men to select moderate confidence ratings (t < 1). Thus, the sex 
difference in category judgment appears to be a genuine sex difference in semantic 
categorization rather than a sex difference in scale use. 
The sex difference in categorization is also consistent with a sex difference in the 
use of tentative language. In general, women tend to use more tentative language such as 
hedges (e.g., “sort of”) and disclaimers (e.g., “I’m not sure”; Carli, 1990). This tendency 
is particularly evident when discussing masculine topics such as sports; when discussing 
feminine topics such as fashion, however, men use more tentative language than women 
(Palomares, 2009). This sex difference in tentative language may reflect the sex 
differences in exclusive and inclusive judgments demonstrated here. 
The present study also replicated a domain difference in categorization 
(Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999; Estes, 2003; Hampton, 1998, 2007; Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009), such that artifact categories were judged with greater vagueness than natural 
categories. This effect is typically attributed to a domain difference in category 
representation. Whereas artifact categories are primarily represented according to their 
functions, which are mutable, natural categories tend to be represented according to their 
appearance and biological features, which are less mutable (e.g., Hampton, Storms, 
Simmons, & Heussen, 2009). More importantly for our purposes, this replication supports 
the validity of our sample.  
This sex difference in categorization could have important social implications in 
career choices and performance. The differential tendency for absolute judgments may 
partially explain the gender gap in fields that allow more or less precision or vagueness, 
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such as sciences and humanities. Furthermore, categorization may also affect 
performance within one’s chosen profession. For instance, male doctors may be more or 
less likely than female doctors to diagnose a given set of symptoms as a disease. The 
potential consequences are manifold, and further studies may be fruitful. 
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Appendix. Stimuli. 
Category Exemplar Category Exemplar
Clothing headband Animals bacterium
pocket fungus
Furniture clock virus
piano yeast
refrigerator Fish clam
shelves crab
Ships canoe lobster
kayak octopus
raft plankton
spacecraft seahorse
Tools computer shrimp
funnel squid
paint Fruits avocado
Toys backgammon coconut
cards cucumber
guitar rhubarb
string tomato
Vehicles horse Insects caterpillar
roller skates leech
tricycle scorpion
wheelchair spider
Weapons car worm
chair Mammals goose
drugs Vegetables pumpkin
fingernails rice
Artifactual Natural
Domain
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Table 1. Percentages of exclusive (nonmember), vague (partial member), and inclusive (full 
member) category judgments of artifact and natural categories by men (N = 55) and women (N = 
58). 
Domain Judgment M SE M SE p d
Artifactual Exclusive 20.15 2.10 20.55 1.96 .89 .03
Vague 45.82 2.75 52.76 2.19 .05 .37
Inclusive 34.04 2.42 26.69 1.99 .02 .44
Natural Exclusive 44.07 2.78 35.10 2.76 .02 .43
Vague 21.45 2.29 30.28 2.39 .01 .50
Inclusive 34.47 2.29 34.62 2.45 .97 .00
Men Women
 
Note. d = Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988). 
